On March 3, 1997, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(hereinafter “the Commission” or “the Inter-American Commission”)
received a petition lodged against the Republic of Venezuela (hereinafter
“the State” or “Venezuela”) by Mrs. Gladis Cardozo Andrade
(hereinafter “the petitioner”), based on Articles 41(f); 44; and
46(1), (a), (b), (c) and (d), of the American Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter “the Convention” or “the American Convention”).
The petition alleges violation by the State of Articles 7(3) (Right
to Personal Liberty); 8(1), (2), (c) and (d) (Right to a Fair Trial); 10
(Right to Compensation); 11(1) and (2) (Right to Privacy); 14(1) (Right of
Reply); 24 (Right to Equal Protection); and 25 (Right to Judicial
Protection) in connection with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, as
a result of a series of proceedings conducted by the Venezuelan courts
which culminated in the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner for
the crime of “false or malicious accusation” to the detriment of a
Superior Court Criminal Judge. The Commission began to process the
petition on August 27, 1997 and the State presented its reply on April 22,
1998. The State argued that
the petition was inadmissible in accordance with Articles 46(1)(b) and
47(c) of the Convention and Article 38(1) of the Commission Regulations
(hereinafter “the Regulations”), inasmuch as it considers that it was
lodged after the deadline for presentation and that none of the allegedly
violated rights had been infringed by Venezuela. The Commission placed
itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to initiating a friendly
settlement procedure on February 10, 1999. That procedure concluded on
March 17, 1999 with the refusal of the offer by the State.
From its analysis of the admissibility requirements, the Commission
finds that the petitioner lodged her petition after the deadline for
presentation and that she did not appropriately exhaust the remedies under
domestic law. Accordingly, it finds the petition inadmissible.
II. PROCESSING BY
On August 27, 1997, the Commission opened the case and requested
the State for information on the facts alleged by the petitioner.
On November 21, 1997, the State presented a request for information
addressed to the petitioner, dated November 19, 1997, alleging that this
information was important for the preparation of the State’s reply.
On March 5, 1998, the petitioner presented a brief of February 26,
1998 with the information requested by Venezuela and, at the same time,
requested by the State to declare its position regarding certain points in
relation with her prosecution and conviction in the Venezuelan courts.
On April 22, 1998, the State submitted its reply to the petition,
arguing that it was inadmissible pursuant to Articles 46(1)(b) and 47(c)
of the American Convention; and Article 38(1) of the Regulations.
The petitioner submitted comments to the State’s reply and the
Commission later received information from both parties.
The Commission received the petitioner’s comments together with
supplementary information on June 3, June 23, July 23, September 8, and
December 29, 1998; on March 9, April 26, June 14, September 27, and
November 15, 1999; and on May 5, 2000.
The State presented its comments on April 22, July 13, and October
13, 1998; on March 11, and September 20, 1999; and on February 1, 2000.
On February 10, 1999, the Commission placed itself at the disposal
of the parties with a view to reaching a friendly settlement, in
accordance with Article 48(1) of the Convention and Article 45 of its
Regulations. On March 9 of
that year, the petitioner presented its acceptance of the Commission’s
offer. On March 11, 1999, the
State informed the Commission of its refusal to the offer.
The Commission concluded the friendly settlement procedure on March
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
According to the petition in May 1989 Mr. Genady Kamenev died,
naming Mrs. Eligia Andrade Bolaños as his heir, in order that she took
care for Mrs. Anastasia de Kamenev, the deceased’s mother, until her
death. In spite of the foregoing, Mr. Ernesto
Croce Navarro, taking advantage of the absence of any relatives and the
elderliness of Mrs. Kamenev, forged a power of attorney in his favor and
began to dispose of the assets of the before mentioned family.
According to the petitioner, in a lucid moment, Mrs. Kamenev,
through her maid, retained her services in order to prevent Mr. Croce from
carrying out his intentions and, as a lawyer, she proceeded to file a
complaint against Mr. Croce in order to revoke the power of attorney that
The petitioner says that subsequently, Mr. Croce was summoned by
the respective court but failed to appear. Instead, he obtained legal
counsel and proceeded formally to accuse a group of persons, among them
the petitioner, of “sequestration and failure to ensure the physical and
emotional well-being” of Mrs. Anastasia de Kamenev.
The petitioner adds that, as a result, the Judge of the 39th
Criminal Court issued a warrant for her arrest and charged her with false
testimony, abandonment of a disabled person, and gang association to
delinquish together with Mrs. Eligia Andrade. The petitioner considers
this measure to be an arbitrary deprivation of her freedom, inasmuch as
the decision was not in keeping with legal requisites.
The petitioner says that the arrest warrants were revoked on appeal
by the 19th Superior Criminal Court.
However, that Court changed the classification of the crimes to
attempted aggravated homicide in the case of Mrs. Andrade, and neglect in
the case of Mrs. Cardozo.
The petitioner claims that during her trial the judge of the 29th
Criminal Court committed many infringements of domestic laws, which
prompted the petitioner to accuse her of adulteration and withholding of a
public document. However, the
7th Criminal Court closed the investigation of the accusation
without carrying out all the procedural steps required by law, on the
grounds of finding the accusation to be “utterly false”.
Mrs. Cardozo says that subsequently the judge charged her with
false or malicious accusation. The court issued a warrant for her arrest,
tried her in absentia, and
convicted her as charged on February 2, 1993.
She adds that there was a clear bias toward the accused Judge
because she was a serving judiciary official, while the petitioner, on the
other hand, was not granted her legally entitled guarantees, did not have
a prior hearing, and was not privy to the criminal enquiry of the charges
The petitioner considers that the court violated her right to be
assisted by legal counsel of her own choosing since it ruled that she was
only entitled to defense during the preliminary proceeding stage and a
public defender was appointed for her for the trial proper, who was not
diligent in her defense, did not pursue the appropriate procedural
remedies, nor stated her opinion for the record regarding the irregular
“closed enquiry.” Accordingly she failed both to fulfill her duty, and
to honor her oath.
She adds that she was tried in an ironical manner, inadequately and
with clear intention, making a mockery of the real meaning of justice.
Although the courts are created to enforce the law, if the law itself
divests a public official of all privileges, the courts can ill grant such
privileges without committing violations of procedural rules, which
undermine the institutions of criminal procedural law.
After the necessary period had elapsed for the statute of
limitations on the judgment to run, Mrs. Cardozo applied for limitation on
September 23, 1994. However, the court issued its decision five months
later, due to the intervention of a court inspector. In that way, she was
granted full freedom on January 13, 1995. Based on the foregoing, she
considers that during that interval she was arbitrarily deprived of her
freedom. On June 30, 1995,
she filed an application for judgment review with the Tribunal for
Protection of Public Assets, which disallowed the application on December
12, 1996. The petitioner
regards both intervals (for reaching the decision on limitation and the
decision to disallow her application for review of judgment) as procedural
delays that violate her right to a prompt, simple and effective remedy.
According to Mrs. Cardozo, her honor and dignity were impaired by
harmful public comments. She considers that from a professional point of view she is
denied the possibility of holding public offices because she lacks ethical
and moral standing, which constitutes a very serious injury and a cause of
irreparable damage to her detriment and to that of her family.
Finally, the petitioner invokes application of Article 10 of the
American Convention, inasmuch as she considers herself to have been the
victim of a miscarriage of justice and arbitrary detentions. She further
invokes her right of reply under Article 14 of the Convention to
inaccurate and offensive information disseminated to the public in general by the written press.
The State requests that the petition be found inadmissible pursuant
to Articles 46(1)(b) and 47(c) of the American Convention, and to Article
38(1) of the Regulations, on grounds that it was lodged after the deadline
for presentation, the violations alleged do not exist, and it does not
state the true facts. The State adds that it has not interfered nor
obstructed Mrs. Gladis Cardozo Andrade’s access to the remedies under
international law and that, on the contrary, the petitioner has been at
full liberty to seek them but that in the instant case has missed the
deadline for doing so.
The State argues that the petition is inadmissible because it was
submitted to the Commission for consideration later than six months after
the petitioner was notified of the final judgment convicting Mrs. Cardozo
of the offense recognized in the Organic Law on Protection of Public
The State says that the sentence imposed on February 2, 1993 became
final the same day because Mrs. Cardozo did not appeal the court’s
decision; furthermore, the petitioner did not lodge her petition with the
Commission until August 27, 1997, which, according to the State,
constitutes a period of more than four years and six months.
The State submits that the six-month rule is closely tied to the
rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies because a violation of the rights
enshrined in the Convention is considered committed at the time the
respective final judgment is rendered under domestic law, which, in the
instant case, is the judgment delivered on February 2, 1993. In any case,
the State considers that it may be deduced from the petition itself that
Mrs. Cardozo was notified of the sentence on the date it was issued
because that is the date she uses in her briefs.
As to the application for review of judgment, the State says that
Mrs. Cardozo sought to create a new judicial instance after finding that
all the deadlines had expired for filing ordinary appeals against the
conviction, and that the application was dismissed based on the absence of
errors in her trial. The
State adds that the application was a criminal appeal that “in no way
modifies or alters the finality of the conviction, and that, given its
extraordinary nature, its admission would have been in order solely to
repair injury caused by unjust sentences;” it is designed to provide
redress to injured parties.
The State argues that the aim of the petition lodged by Mrs.
Cardozo against Venezuela is for the Commission to proceed to examine,
appraise, and issue a decision on the factual and legal grounds on which
the Venezuelan courts based the judgments they issued in the cases related
to the instant petition. The State also says that both the Inter-American
Court and the Commission have stated on various occasions that the
Commission cannot review judgments issued by the domestic courts acting
within their competence and with due judicial guarantees, in order to
examine, appraise and pronounce a decision on the de
facto and de jure arguments
on which they based their judgments, unless it considers that a possible
violation of the Convention is involved.
The State adds that the Commission's task is to ensure the
observance of the obligations undertaken by the States parties to the
Convention, but it cannot serve as an appellate court to examine alleged
errors of internal law or fact that may have been committed by the
domestic courts acting within their jurisdiction, since it is not a fourth
instance. The State also
holds that Mrs. Cardozo has taken out of context the protected rights
alleged as violated, since clearly they do not amount to a violation of
The State deems it necessary to point out that Mrs. Cardozo was
tried in absentia due to her
refusal to appear in court, but she was always duly represented by a
public defender. This trial in
absentia also resulted from the fact that she was accused of a crime
recognized in the Organic Law on Protection of Public Assets, which
permits defendants to be tried in their absence.
The State adds that Mrs. Gladis Cardozo did enjoy the judicial
guarantees contained in Article 8 of the Convention and that of her own
volition she did not appear in court to hear the accusation made against
her nor filed any appeal against the conviction, and, as she failed to
obtain a satisfactory decision, she filed a petition alleging violation of
Article 8 of the American Convention, even though the Commission is not an
organ whose task is to review the decisions pronounced.
As regards the alleged failure of the Venezuelan courts to accord
her equal treatment, the State holds that the petitioner has not provided
any information on how her rights were violated, nor advanced any evidence
to support the alleged impartiality to her detriment, and that, in spite
of her position as a lawyer aspiring to a judgeship, she did not attempt
any of the remedies under domestic law designed to protect her right to
defense, such as recusation. The State adds that the petitioner was
negligent in the exercise of her rights and intends that the Commission
examine and appraise defenses that she never used. The State argues that,
on the contrary, the petitioner remained a fugitive of the Venezuelan
justice until she was sure that the statute of limitations on the sentence
The State says that the argument of alleged arbitrary deprivation
of the petitioner’s freedom for a period of a month and a half, due to
the fact that the warrant issued for her arrest was subsequently revoked,
is groundless since the preventive measure imposed on Mrs. Cardozo was the
result of an arrest warrant that came from a competent judge who was
taking cognizance of the proceeding in which she was involved, and was
issued in accordance with a number of concurrent requirements set forth in
the Venezuelan Code of Criminal Procedure.
In that regard the State cites the observations of the
Inter-American Court which has found in the sense that remanding an
innocent person in custody on the orders of a competent judge does not
constitute an illegal act, since such an illegal act would only be
originated by a failure to respond to the violation as required by the
The State adds that the fact that the decision should subsequently
have been revoked by a superior court does not mean that the detention was
arbitrary but, rather, reflects the existence of the right of defense in
the proceeding, which was successfully exercised by Mrs. Gladis Cardozo.
The State holds that Mrs. Cardozo’s argument that her right to
privacy was violated is false, given that all that can be concluded from
the press articles cited by the petitioner is that the Judicature Council
excluded Mrs. Cardozo from a list of applicants for a judgeship in 1989
because her conduct was open to question. At the time there was a warrant
out for the petitioner’s arrest and she was the subject of a criminal
inquiry. Based on the foregoing it is not true that the aforesaid
declarations can be concluded as violatory but, rather, that they resulted
from events that occurred at the time.
As to the alleged violation of the right to a prompt and simple
remedy, the State argues that the Convention does not say that violation
of the right to a prompt and simple remedy occurs when a decision is made
outside of the period provided under national law.
The delay must be unwarranted and in both cases the appeals were
decided within a reasonable period and, on the contrary, the record shows
that there is no appeal pending or that has not been processed in
Venezuela. Consequently, it
is unfounded for Mrs. Cardozo, who acknowledges the existence of the
remedy of amparo from which she
obtained a favorable result for herself, to allege violation of Article 25
of the Convention.
Finally, the State requests the Inter-American Commission to find
the petition inadmissible due to the information provided and the
arguments advanced by the petitioner, since the facts stated do not
tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention,
on which basis it is groundless and out of order.
Competence of the Commission
The petitioner claims that the State has violated her rights under
Articles 1(1); 7(3); 8(1), (2), (c) and (d); 10; 11(1), (2); 24 and 25 of
the American Convention. The State ratified the American Convention on Human Rights on
August 9, 1977 and the events connected with the petition lodged with the
Commission occurred after ratification of the American Convention by the
Venezuelan State. Based on
the foregoing, the Commission finds that it is has ratione materiae and ratione
loci competence, inasmuch as the petition concerns rights protected by
the American Convention in respect of the Republic of Venezuela.
With respect to ratione personae competence, the petition was lodged by Mrs. Gladis
Cardozo Andrade, who has the legal capacity to present the petition to the
Commission in accordance with Article 44 of the American Convention.
Accordingly, the Commission is competent to take up this petition pursuant
to Article 44 of the American Convention and Articles 18 and 19 of its
As to ratione temporis competence, the Commission concludes, based on
examination of the information presented by both parties and its own
interpretation of the admissibility requirements for lodging the petition,
that it lacks competence to take up the petition in pursuance of Article
46(1)(a) and (b) of the American Convention and Articles 37 and 38 of its
Regulations for the reasons examined below.
Requirements for the admissibility of the petition
of domestic remedies and period of presentation
In accordance with Article 46(1)(a) and (b) of the American
Convention, admission of a petition is
subject to the requirements that the remedies under domestic law have been
pursued and exhausted and that the petition is lodged within a period of
six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his
rights was notified of the final judgment under the domestic remedies.
The foregoing is founded on the fact that the State has a legal
duty to provide suitable and effective domestic remedies in order to
redress violations of human rights; and, as a counterpart thereto, the
alleged victim has the obligation to exhaust procedures under domestic
law, barring the applicable exceptions, by pursuing suitable remedies for
resolving the alleged violations. This
requirement exists in order for the State concerned to have the
opportunity to settle disputes within its own legal framework.
In the instant case the State considers that the petition was
lodged later than the six-month period following the final judgment issued
against Mrs. Gladis Cardozo and that, therefore, the petition is
inadmissible under that precept. The
petitioner, for her part, argues on several occasions that the onus is on
the State to disprove her allegations and that the petition contains
sufficient evidence to reject this argument advanced by the State.
Furthermore, she holds that she is able to present the petition because
she exhausted domestic remedies, namely recusation, indictment, appeals,
accusations and application for review of judgment.
In this regard the Commission finds that some of the domestic
remedies that the petitioner deems pursued were not done so by her
directly but, rather, by other interested parties in the proceeding, such
as Mrs. Tibisay Díaz.
Nevertheless this situation is of secondary importance on observing that
it is the conviction of February 2, 1993, which directly affects the
petitioner and which causes res
judicata in respect of a criminal matter.
Mrs. Cardozo did not impugn this judgment until after the statute
of limitations had run on the sentence, and she did so by means of an
application for review filed on June 30, 1995.
In connection with the foregoing, the Commission analyzes if the
application for review filed by the petitioner is a suitable and effective
remedy for impugning decisions in which, as in the case in question, a
petitioner alleges errors in the application of legal norms or in the
interpretation of the facts by the State. The Commission also examines if
said remedy is suitable for exhaustion of domestic remedies prior to
resorting to the inter-American system.
Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention speaks of “generally
recognized principles of international law.” Those principles refer not
only to the formal existence of such remedies, but also to their adequacy
and effectiveness, as shown by the exceptions set out in Article 46(2).
In this connection, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address
an infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal
system of every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance.
If a remedy is not adequate in a specific case, it obviously need not be
exhausted. A norm is meant to have an effect and should not be interpreted
in such a way as to negate its effect or lead to a result that is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
A remedy must also be effective - that is, capable of producing the
result for which it was designed. The mere fact that a domestic remedy
does not produce a result favorable to the petitioner does not in and of
itself demonstrate the inexistence or exhaustion of all effective domestic
remedies. For example, the petitioner may not have invoked the appropriate
remedy in a timely fashion.
In respect of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
petitioner had access to several suitable remedies to impugn her
conviction. However, she did not attempt any legal action against the
judgment, either directly or through her legal representative.
Mrs. Cardozo alleges that the public defender she was assigned to
was not diligent in her defense and did not pursue the appropriate
procedural remedies; while the State considers that she was tried in
absentia because of her refusal to appear in court, but was always
duly represented by a public defender in a proceeding involving a crime
for which the law provides that possibility.
It is the opinion of the Commission that if Mrs. Cardozo disagreed
with the court’s decision, she had the opportunity of pursuing the
remedies available to her under domestic law. However, she remained absent
and it was not until the statute of limitations had run on the sentence
that she filed an application for review of the judgment.
On the other hand, the Inter-American Court has found that:
There are innumerable references in legal writings to the remedy of
revision as an exceptional recourse for preventing a res judicata
from maintaining a patently unjust situation resulting from the discovery
of a fact which, had it been known at the time the judgment was delivered,
would have altered its outcome, or which would demonstrate the existence
of a substantive defect in the judgment.
The legal motives envisaged as reasons for the remedy of revision are
restrictive in nature, inasmuch as the remedy is always directed against
orders that have acquired the effect of res judicata, that is,
against judgments of a decisive nature or interlocutory judgments that are
passed and put an end to the proceeding.
The remedy of revision must be based on important facts or situations that
were unknown at the time the judgment was delivered. The judgment may
therefore be impugned for exceptional reasons, such as those involving
documents the existence of which was unknown at the time the judgment was
delivered; documentary or testimonial evidence or confessions in a
judgment that has acquired the effect of a final judgment and is later
found to be false; when there has been prevarication, bribery, violence,
or fraud, and facts subsequently proven to be false, such as a person
having been declared missing and found to be alive.
In the most favorable of hypotheses for the petitioner, her
application for review could result in the Venezuelan courts pronouncing
on the conduct but not on the merits of the case prosecuted against her,
since the latter lacked all legal effects because the statute of
limitations on the sentence had run.
Consequently, that application could not result in a decision that
would restore her situation to its former state or annul the violations
alleged by the alleged victim. Mrs.
Cardozo filed an application for review that, in the opinion of the
Commission, did not fully satisfy the objective of impugning the judgment
imposed, since the statute of limitations thereon had run.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission concludes that the remedy
of revision is patently inappropriate to redress the allegedly violated
legal situation. The Commission also concludes that the aforesaid initiative
does not constitute a legal remedy in the sense of Article 46(1)(a) of the
Convention and, therefore, also fails to meet the requirement of the
six-month deadline provided in Article 46(1)(b) of that instrument because
more than four years and one month elapsed between the final judgment
rendered by the Venezuelan courts and the petition lodged with the
Based on the examination of the information presented by both
parties and its own interpretation of the admissibility requirements for
lodging the petition, the Commission finds the petition inadmissible in
accordance with Article 46(1)(a) and (b) of the American Convention and
Articles 37 and 38 of its Regulations.
Based on the analysis and conclusions contained in the instant
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
1. To declare the
instant case inadmissible.
To transmit the instant report to the petitioner and to the
Republic of Venezuela; and
To publish the instant report and include it in its Annual Report
to the OAS General Assembly.
Done and signed in Washington, D.C., on the 3rd day of the month of October, 2000. (Signed): Hélio Bicudo, Chairman; Claudio Grossman, First Vice-Chairman; Juan Méndez, Second Vice-Chairman, Marta Altolaguirre, Robert K. Goldman, Peter Laurie and Julio Prado Vallejo, Commissioners.
Mrs. Andrade was employed as a maid by the Kamenev household and cared
for Mrs. De Kamenev in view of her delicate health and elderliness.
Furthermore, Mrs. Tibisay Díaz, niece of Mrs. Eligia Andrade and
partner of the deceased, Mr. Genady de Kamenev, filed a petition to
declare Mrs. de Kamenev incompetent with the 5th Civil
Court. As a result of that proceeding, Mrs. Eligia Andrade was
appointed provisional guardian of Mrs. Anastasia de Kamenev.
In this regard, the petitioner mentions that the 34th
Criminal Court found that she was only entitled to the assistance of
her attorney during the preliminary stage of the proceeding, and a
public defender was appointed for her for the trial proper, who was
not diligent in her defense, did not pursue the respective procedural
remedies, nor pronounced his opinion for the record regarding the
“irregular closed enquiry.”
Petitioner’s Brief of March 3, 1997, p. 2.
Article 80 of the Organic Law on Protection of Public Assets provides
that, “Private citizens and public officials who falsely or
maliciously denounce or accuse a person or official of committing any
punishable act or acts recognized in the instant Law shall be punished
with a term of imprisonment of one to three years.”
In respect of this point it should be emphasized that at the time of
ratifying the American Convention Venezuela made a reservation as
regards Article 8(1), insofar as Article 60(5) of the Constitution of
the Republic of Venezuela establishes that persons accused of an
offense against the res publica
may be tried in absentia,
with the guarantees and in the manner prescribed by law. Such a
possibility is not provided for in the aforementioned Article 8.
The State’s reply of April 21, 1998, page 9.
It cites cases heard by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Velásquez Rodríguez Case, paragraph 173 and Godínez Cruz
Case, paragraph 183.
The petitioner’s brief of February 26, 1997, presented to the IACHR
on March 3, 1997,
See paragraphs 10 and 13 of the instant report.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29,
1988, para. 64.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29,
1988, paras. 66 and 67.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Application for Judicial Review
of the Judgment of January 29, 1997, Order of the Court of September
13, 1997, paras. 10-12.
In this regard, the European Commission of Human Rights, upon
examining Article 26 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
sets a similar deadline to that in Article 46(1) of the American
Convention, established the following:
Commission recalls that it has the competence in every case to
appreciate, in the light of the particular facts, whether any given
remedy appears in a given case to offer the possibility of effective
and sufficient redress, within the meaning of the generally recognized
rules of international law in regard to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies and, if not, to exclude it from consideration in applying the
six months time-limit.
European Commission of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports, No. 35,
Request No. 10326/83, Decision of October 6, 1983, page 220.
that same end, another decision of the European Commission is worthy
of mention. In that decision, it declared inadmissible an accusation
against Ireland, also based on Article 26 of the European Convention
of Human Rights. In that case, the European Commission examined the
request made by the petitioner to the Attorney General for
authorization to appeal to the Supreme Court and found that it was not
an effective recourse under the principles recognized by international
law. In arriving at that conclusion, the Commission took into account
that the possibility of obtaining such authorization was not a right,
but rather was up to the discretion of the Attorney General and that:
appeal to the Supreme Court] is not a remedy which is part of the
ordinary hierarchy of judicial decisions which a person complaining of
his trial, conviction and sentence would normally be obliged to
the Attorney General's decision to refuse a Section 29 Certificate
cannot be taken into consideration in determining the date of the
final decision for the purpose of applying the six months' time-limit
laid down in Article 26.
Commission of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports, No. 26, Request No.
9136/80, Decision of July 10, 1981, page 244.
See also: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 32/98, Case 11.507 (Mexico), May 5, 1998, IACHR 1998 Annual Report, pp. 371-377.