Thus, Article 114 of the Criminal Code of Ecuador, in effect when
Dayra María Levoyer was detained, establishes that:
who, having been kept in detention for a time equal to or greater than one
third of the period established in the Criminal Code as the maximum
sentence for the offense with which they are charged, have neither had
their case discontinued nor been committed to trial, shall be immediately
released by the judge hearing the case.
who, having been kept in detention for a time equal to or greater than one
half of the period established in the Criminal Code as the maximum
sentence for the offense with which they are charged, have not been
sentenced, shall be released immediately by the criminal court hearing the
provisions do not include persons charged with offenses under the
Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act.
The Commission notes that the domestic law provides for four to
eight years of imprisonment for the offenses of asset laundering, transfer
of assets, and acting as a “front.”
Levoyer Jiménez was detained on June 21, 1992, and was kept in preventive
detention for more than six years, a period equivalent to more than one
third and more than one half of the maximum corresponding sentences.
However, the proceedings against Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez came within
the exception provided in the last sentence of Article 114 of the Criminal
Code of Ecuador and thus she was unable to benefit from the maximum
periods of preventive detention established in the legislation.
This exception, however, has now been invalidated both internally
and internationally. In a judgment rendered on November 17, 1997, in the Suárez
Rosero Case, the Inter-American Court declared that the wording of the
final paragraph of Article 114 of the Criminal Code of Ecuador was a
violation de jure of the
obligation contained in the Convention to adopt the necessary measures in
domestic law to render effective the right to personal liberty established
in Article 7(5) of the American Convention.
As the Inter-American Court has stated, although domestic law
establishes objective conditions for the release of individuals imprisoned
without a sentence, the exception established in the final paragraph of
Article 114 deprives an entire category of persons in detention of the
enjoyment of a right solely on the basis of the offense with which they
Moreover, as reported to the Commission in the present case, on
December 24, 1997, a Plenary Session of the Constitutional Court of
Ecuador declared that the last part of Article 114 of the Criminal Code
was unconstitutional. This declaration made it possible to apply the
maximum period of preventive detention to cases such as that of Mrs.
As to the parameters of Article 7(5) of the Convention, the
Commission has established that whenever preventive detention is extended
beyond the period stipulated in domestic law, this should be considered prima
facie illegal, regardless of the nature of the offense in question and
the complexity of the case. In such circumstances, the burden of proof in
justifying the delay rests with the State.
In the instant case, the declaration that the last part of Article
114 was unconstitutional did affect the deprivation of liberty, until six
months later. In fact, on
June 16, 1998, Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was released as a result of a
decision on one of the many writs of habeas
corpus filed. At that time, the Second Division of the Constitutional
Court considered the terms of preventive detention established in the
Criminal Code to have been fulfilled through the application of the
precedent noted. Consequently, for a period of six months, Mrs. Levoyer
Jiménez remained in preventive detention, without any domestic law
justifying her detention, in direct violation of the norm contained in
Article 7(5) of the Convention, which establishes that every individual
must be judged within a reasonable time or be set free, as well as Article
7(2) which stipulates that detention beyond the period specified in
domestic law constitutes illegal detention.
Moreover, the Commission concludes that although the exception
contained in Article 114 of the Ecuadorian Criminal Code was declared
unconstitutional on December 24, 1997 (a ruling which benefited all
individuals accused of offenses under the Narcotics and Psychotropic
Substances Act), the fact that Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez was not
released until six months after this ruling was made, is a violation of
Article 2 of the American Convention because the State did not adopt the
adequate measures under domestic law to render effective the right
contained in Article 7(5) of the American Convention.
Lastly, the fact that Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was not arraigned in
Court immediately after she was detained is a further violation of Article
detention, personal liberty, and Habeas
Corpus – Violation of Articles 7(6) and 25
The petitioner maintained that, when she was detained, Mrs. Levoyer
Jiménez was taken to the former SIC facilities, where she was kept
incommunicado in an underground cell for 39 days. In its submission on the
merits of the case, on May 18, 2000, the petitioner alleged that Mrs.
Levoyer Jiménez’s incommunicado detention lasted from her detention on June 21, 1992,
at the Police Station, until July 30, 1992, the date on which she was
taken to a prison. The State
did not dispute this assertion in its response.
The Inter-American Court has established that:
detention is an exceptional measure the purpose of which is to
prevent any interference with the investigation of the facts. Such
isolation must be limited to the period of time expressly established by
law. Even in that case, the State is obliged to ensure that the detainee
enjoys the minimum and non-derogable guarantees established in the
Convention and, specifically, the right to question the lawfulness of the
detention and the guarantee of access to effective defense during his
Article 28 of the Constitution of Ecuador provides that:
person who believes that he is being unlawfully deprived of his liberty
may seek the remedy of habeas corpus. He may exercise this right himself or through another
person, without the need for a written request, before the Mayor, under
whose jurisdiction he finds himself or whoever is serving as Mayor.
The municipal authority shall order immediately that the accused
appear before him, and the order for the deprivation of liberty will be
While she was held incommunicado,
Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez did not have the opportunity to have her detention
reviewed by a court. In addition, after her period in incommunicado
detention was over, she presented numerous writs of habeas corpus without success. Although access to recourse does not
imply that a favorable result is guaranteed,
the right of access to a fair trial in this case required that a judge
review the reasons for the detention and whether it was consistent with
international law, something that did not occur when any of the writs of habeas
corpus were filed.
Accordingly, the Commission finds that Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez’s incommunicado detention constituted a violation of Article 7(6) of
the American Convention since it prevented the person detained from having
contact with the outside world and did not allow her to exercise the
remedy of habeas corpus.
The petitioner further alleges that the lack of a response or the
delay in responding to the writs of habeas
corpus filed in the present case violates the guarantees provided in
Articles 7(6) and 25 of the American Convention. The State has not
responded expressly to this allegation.
Article 7(6) of the Convention provides that:
who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a
competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest
or detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws provide that anyone
who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is
entitled to recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on
the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may not be restricted or
abolished. The interested party or another person in his behalf is
entitled to seek these remedies.
Article 25 of the Convention states that:
has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts
that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws
of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation
may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official
Article 458 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that
whenever an individual who has been detained applies to a competent court
to request release, the judge must immediately order the appearance of the
individual and after evaluating the necessary information, is required to
decide on the request within the next 48 hours.
The guarantee of access to simple and prompt recourse provided in
the Convention is not satisfied by the mere formal existence of suitable
remedies to ensure an order for release. The Court has noted that such
remedies must be effective given their purpose of obtaining a prompt
decision on the question of the legality of the arrest or the detention.
These rights constitute one of the basic pillars of the rule of law
in a democratic society.
The documentary evidence attached to the file indicates that the
petitioner repeatedly appeared on behalf of Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez before
the competent judges with the request that the precautionary measure be
lifted or that her illegal detention be terminated.
In each case, with the exception of the decision of June 22, 1998,
which ordered her release, the writs of habeas
corpus were ignored or denied with delay.
With respect to Article 25 of the American Convention, the Court
ruled as follows in the Suárez
25 of the American Convention provides that everyone has the right to
simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a
competent court or tribunal. The Court has ruled that this provision
constitutes one of the fundamental pillars not only of the American
Convention, but also of the very rule of law in a democratic society in
the sense of the Convention.
25 is closely linked to the general obligation contained in Article 1(1)
of the American Convention, in assigning protective functions to the
domestic law of States Parties. The purpose of habeas
corpus is not only to ensure respect for the right to personal liberty
and physical integrity, but also to prevent the person's disappearance or
the keeping of his whereabouts secret and, ultimately, to ensure his right
to life. (Castrillo Páez
Case, Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, paras. 82 and 83)..
Therefore, the Commission, having weighed the evidence furnished by
the parties, concludes that Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez’s right to a
simple and prompt recourse in order to protect her basic rights, pursuant
to Articles 7(6) and 25 of the American Convention, was violated.
In addition, the Commission considers it necessary to examine the
provisions of Article 28 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, transcribed
above, which provide that the right of habeas
corpus be modified to conform to the provisions of the American
Convention. Article 7(8) of the Convention clearly states that: “Anyone
who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a
competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on
the lawfulness of his arrest or detention” (emphasis added).
However, the Ecuadorian Constitution establishes that the Mayor, as
the head of the municipal administration,
is the one who decides
on the legality or illegality of an arrest.
The review of the legality of a detention implies confirming, not
only formally but also substantively, that the detention conforms to the
requirements of the judicial system and that it does not violate any of
the detained person’s rights. That such confirmation is carried out by a
judge, invests the proceeding with certain guarantees that are not duly
protected if the decision is in the hands of an administrative authority,
who lacks the proper legal training and the authority to exercise judicial
The danger in having decisions of this kind left in the hands of a
municipal authority has been noted previously by the same Ecuadorian
Constitutional Court, which maintained that:
lawfulness of the detention is an important aspect of the remedy of habeas
corpus, and this is what must be examined; not the apparent lawfulness
but the true lawfulness, in substance or in form [emphasis in the
original]. In most cases, Mayors, most probably because
they are unaware of constitutional provisions must limit themselves to
verifying whether the person detained is present at the order of a judge
and whether the latter has issued, even illegally and after the statute
of limitations has passed, an order of preventive detention, and
solely on this basis after a hearing denies the recourse of habeas corpus, which in substance implies ignorance of the
significance of the right to liberty, as an important constitutional
guarantee [emphasis added].
This constitutional provision violates Article 7(6) of the American
Convention. The Commission considers it essential for the State of Ecuador
to take the necessary steps to reform its legislation in this area as well
as to take whatever action is necessary to implement this legislation
detention. Cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. Violation of Article
The petitioner also alleged that the prolonged duration of the
state of incommunicado detention
to which Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was subjected constituted cruel and
inhumane treatment pursuant to Article 5(2) of the American Convention.
This Article states:
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
The Inter-American Court has considered that the mere fact that a
person has been deprived of any communication with the outside world
allows it to conclude that such person was subjected to cruel and inhuman
treatment, and even more so when it is proven to be in violation of
Hence, the Inter-American Court has maintained that:
of the reasons that incommunicado
detention is considered to be an exceptional instrument is the grave
effect it has on the detained person. Indeed, isolation from the outside
world produces moral and psychological suffering in any person, places him
in a particularly vulnerable position […].]
Therefore, based on its assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties, the Commission concludes that the prolonged incommunicado
detention to which Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez was subjected was a
violation of the right established in Article 5(2) of the American
Respect for judicial protection
The petitioner has indicated that in the present case the State was
unable to guarantee Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez’s fundamental rights from the
time she was detained in June 1992, and that the guarantees established in
Article 8 of the American Convention were violated. In its admissibility
report, the Commission maintained that “… a decision on the duration
of the proceedings presupposes an analysis of the merits of the case.
Accordingly, the Commission resolves to postpone the question of
admissibility of the alleged violations of Articles 8, 21 and 25 of the
Convention until its treatment of the merits of the case…”
The Commission turns now to an examination of the facts in light of
the guarantee of a trial within a reasonable period and the general
principles of a presumption of innocence and non
bis in idem, as expressed in the American Convention.
The determination of guilt within a reasonable time - Violation
The petitioner maintained, during the instant case, that the delay
in the proceedings against Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez violated her right to be
tried within a reasonable period.
Article 8(1) of the American Convention states:
person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of
a criminal nature made against him […]
The purpose of the principle of “reasonable time” to which this
Article refers is to prevent persons accused of an offense from remaining
in that situation indefinitely. In criminal matters, the time covers the
entire proceeding including any appeals that may be filed.
As to whether the duration of a case is reasonable, in the
jurisprudence of the Commission and the Inter-American Court, the
reasonableness of the duration of a case has been developed to mean that
it must be evaluated in light of the three following criteria: the
complexity of the matter, the procedural activity of the individual
concerned, and the conduct of the judicial authorities.
With respect to the duration of proceedings, the State maintained
in its response of January 26, 2000, that:
reasonableness of a measure or a period needs to be evaluated in its own
specific context, and the State has resolved this case, within a period in
keeping with the type of trial involved, within the scope of the
possibilities at its disposable. Accordingly, the State of Ecuador cannot
be accused of delaying the decision in the matter of Mrs. Dayra María
Levoyer Jiménez, when, despite its complexity, it has moved rapidly
through the competent tribunals. Given the fact that the periods within
which the State acted to resolve the domestic proceedings are within the
limits of reasonableness established by the Court and the Commission, it
cannot be charged with having violated the guarantee established in
The Commission is of the view that the State’s assertion is not
sufficient to justify the reasonableness of the period. In fact, the State
limits itself to indicating what, in its judgment, are the requirements of
reasonable time, and concludes that in the instant case the period was
effectively reasonable without providing any grounds that would lead to
such a conclusion.
In the present case, the detention of Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez on June
21, 1992, marks the beginning of multiple proceedings based on the same
facts and evidence. According to the information furnished to the
Commission, this case has not yet concluded.
The Commission is of the view that the nearly eight years that have
elapsed since the investigation began is well beyond the principle of
reasonable time within which to resolve a case, especially in light of the
fact that according to Ecuadorian law even when a provisional dismissal
has been issued, the case remains open for six years, a period during
which the investigation may be reopened if fresh evidence is produced.
situation is exacerbated when it is considered that to date proceedings
against the accused have been dismissed in all of the cases that have
Therefore, the Commission, having weighed the evidence furnished by
the parties, concludes that the State has violated Dayra María Levoyer
Jimenez’s right to be tried within a reasonable time, in accordance with
Article 8(1) of the American Convention.
The principle of presumption of innocence - Violation of Article
The petitioner maintains that depriving Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez of
her liberty is a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence
established in the American Convention. It notes that in the present case
the imposition of preventive detention for an indefinite period was
tantamount to anticipating the punishment.
The State has not presented its position on the principle of
presumption of innocence in the instant case.
Article 8(2) of the American Convention states that:
person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent
so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law.
The Inter-American Court has ruled that the very purpose of these
judicial guarantees is founded upon the principle that a person is
innocent until proven guilty in a final judicial decision.
the universally accepted general principles of law prohibit anticipating
the punishment before sentencing. Ignoring
these rules would run the risk, as in the instant case, of restricting for
an unreasonable time the liberty of a person whose guilt has not been
proven. It should be recalled that in this case Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was
deprived of her liberty for a period that exceeded one half the maximum
penalty established for the offense of which she was accused and
acquitted, and she continued to be detained even after her acquittal had
Having considered the evidence presented by the parties, the
Commission concludes, in the case of Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez, that
the Ecuadorian State has violated the principle of presumption of
innocence enshrined in Article 8(2) of the American Convention.
Non bis in idem - Violation
of Article 8(4)
In its submission of May 18, 2000, the petitioner alleged that the
State of Ecuador violated the American Convention insofar as it initiated
three sets of proceedings on the same facts and the same offense by three
different courts in succession.
As noted by the petitioner, the first trial for asset laundering
was instituted in 1992, with the first instance proceedings held before
the President of the Superior Court, and the second instance before the
Fourth Division of the same Court, which in April 1998 dismissed the case.
The second trial, also for asset laundering, was instituted in 1994
on the basis of an expanded report on the 1992 Operation Cyclone. The
first instance proceedings were held before the President of the Superior
Court and the second instance proceedings before the Second Division of
the same Court, which in July 1999 dismissed the case.
The third trial for asset laundering was instituted in 1996, on the
basis of a new expanded report on Operation Cyclone. These first instance
proceedings were held before the First Criminal Court, and subsequently
before the Eighth Court of Appeal, which in March 1999 issued a
provisional dismissal. The case was appealed to the First Division of the
Superior Court, which has not yet returned a decision.
It appears from the foregoing that Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was tried
simultaneously for the same offense of asset laundering and on the basis
of these facts, on two occasions by the same judge (the President of the
Superior Court of Quito), and on a third occasion by the Judge of the
Eighth Criminal Court.
The Commission is of the view that such a situation, apart from
disregarding principles of procedural economy, could only cause harm to
Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez, who was compelled to defend herself before three
different courts and the corresponding appeal courts, during all three
sets of proceedings. The Commission considers that in the instant case the
requirement of responding to the parallel proceedings constituted a
serious interference with the exercise of the right to a defense and legal
certainty in judicial proceedings.
As to the alleged violation of the American Convention, Article
An accused person acquitted
by a nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the
The purpose of codifying the principle of non
bis in idem is to establish a safeguard for persons acquitted in a
nonappealable decision so that they may not be tried in new proceedings
for the same offense for which they were tried during the first
It has been determined that Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was tried in
three sets of proceedings for the same offense of asset laundering.
Although these proceedings were instituted in parallel, the different
courts rendered their decisions on the merits of the case successively,
confirming a triple violation of the principle established in the
Convention. The first violation occurred with the second proceedings, when
the President of the Superior Court neglected to close the case after
having seen that the Fourth Division of the Court dismissed the case in
April 1998 in issuing judgment
on appeal in the first case. The second violation occurred when the Eighth
Criminal Court closed neither the third case nor the second when the first
judgment was rendered. The third violation took place because the appeal
court, that is the First Division of the Superior Court, has not resolved
the matter to the present time.
This violation of the principle non
bis in idem was recognized in the judgment of the Second Division
where it was maintained that:
… having to do with
… an expanded investigation report … of the investigation of Operation
Cyclone, judges and courts run a real risk of violating the constitution
and the law by judging a person more than once for the same offense or of
continuing to institute proceedings against a group of persons as often as
expanded reports of a police investigation which apparently has not
concluded are prepared by continuing such reports ad infinitum, an act
that violates constitutional guarantees and precepts, particularly what is
established in paragraph 16 of Article 24 of the Constitution …
Based on the assessment of the evidence produced by the parties,
the Commission concludes that the State violated Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez’s
right not to be tried more than once for the same offense, as established
in Article 8(4) of the American Convention.
Violation of the right to own property -
Violation of Article 21
The petitioner alleged that in the instant case Article 21 of the
Convention was also violated insofar as the goods that were seized when
Mrs. Levoyer Jiménez was arrested have not yet been returned to her.
In resolving the issue of the admissibility of the present case,
the Commission considered that the analysis of the present issue concerned
the merits of the case and therefore decided to defer its decision for the
According to the petitioner’s submission, when the charge of
acting as a “front” was dismissed, it was requested that the many
goods seized at the time of her arrest be returned to her. The judge
denied the request, on grounds that the matter was still before the
Courts, and that the goods would be returned when a final decision was
taken. The petitioner alleges
that this final decision could take more than five years, and that the
goods would not be returned if the proceedings are dismissed, thus
constituting a violation of Article 21 of the Convention.
The Ecuadorian Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the res judicata effect of the (definitive) dismissal of proceedings,
but not those that are (provisionally) dismissed. The petitioner alleges
that even if the case had been definitively dismissed, the result would
not be a judgment and therefore the goods would never be returned.
The relevant sections of Article 110 of the Narcotics and
Psychotropic Substances Act state that “If the person charged with an
offense is acquitted, any property he owns that has been seized shall be
restored to him … when so ordered by the court once the precautionary
measures have been lifted…”
The Commission is of the view that the provisions cannot be
construed to mean that a definitive dismissal is different from an
acquittal because it is a decision that concludes the proceedings
definitively and puts a stop to further investigation of the accused for
the same facts. A violation of Article 21 would require a finding in
the present case that the State refused to return the property once a
final decision has been rendered, a case in which the right to property
would be violated.
The Commission considers, therefore, that the petitioner has not
presented facts that if true, would constitute a violation of the
Convention, and therefore has decided
to admit the complaint on this point.
ACTIONS TAKEN FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF REPORT No 81/00
119. On October 5,
2000, during the course of its 108th
period of sessions, the Commission approved Report 81/00, pursuant
to Article 50 of the American Convention. Report 81/00 was transmitted to
the Ecuadorian State on October 26, 2000 with the corresponding
recommendations and was granted a period of 60 days within which to inform
the Commission regarding the measures it had taken in order to comply with
Since October 26, 2000, the State has not been in contact with the
Commission regarding the instant case, nor does the Commission have
information regarding the State’s having taken any of the
recommendations mentioned above.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the facts and the law,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights hereby concludes that with
respect to Dayra Maria Levoyer Jimenez, the State of Ecuador has violated
the right to humane treatment (Article 5), the right to personal liberty
(Article 7), the right to due process (Article 25), together with the
general obligation to respect and ensure set forth in Article 1(1) of the
The Commission further considers that the complaint relating to the
violation of Article 21 of the American Convention is not admissible
because the evidence presented does not constitute a violation of the
123. Based on the
foregoing considerations presented in the present report and the
conclusions reached, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
recommends that the State of Ecuador:
Proceed to grant full reparations, which involves granting adequate
compensation to Mrs. Dayra Maria Levoyer Jimenez;
Order an investigation to determine responsibility for the
violations detected by the Commission and eventually to punish the
Take such steps as are necessary to reform habeas
corpus legislation as
indicated in the present report, as well as to enact such reforms with
On February 28, 2001, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
transmitted Report No 16/01–the
text of which appears above—to the Ecuadorian State and to the
petitioners, pursuant to Article 51(2) of the American Convention and
granted the State a period of one month in order to comply with the
recommendations therein. Until
the date of the approval of the present report no response has been
received from the Ecuadorian State.
In light of the above considerations and the provisions of Article
51(3) of the American Convention, the Commission decides to reiterate the
conclusions and recommendations contained in this report, to make them
public and to include them in its Annual Report to the OAS General
Assembly. The Commission, in
compliance with its mandate, will continue to evaluate the measures taken
by the State of Ecuador in relation with the above mentioned
recommendations, until they have been completely complied with.
Done and signed at the headquarters of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, in the city of Washington, D.C., on the 14th
day of the month of June in the year 2001.
(Signed) Claudio Grossman, Chairman; Juan Mendez, First Vice-President; Marta Altolaguirre, Second Vice-President; Commissioners:
Helio Bicudo, Robert K. Goldman; and Peter Laurie.
Articles 77 and 78 of the Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act.
Int.Ct.H.R. Suárez Rosero Case,
Judgment of November 17, 1997, paragraph 99.
Id. Paragraph 98.
Report 12/96 op. cit.,
Int. Ct.H.R. Suárez Rosero
Case, op. cit. paragraph 51.
Int.Ct.H.R. Velásquez Rodríguez
Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, paragraph 63ff.
Int.Ct.H.R. Castillo Páez Case,
Judgment of November 3, 1997, paragraph 82.
Article 68 of the municipal system act provides that: “The councils
shall have a Mayor to direct the municipal administration”, and
Article 26 of the same act states that: “The municipal government
and administration is administered jointly by the Council and the
Case 241-98HC. Judgment of the Second Division of the Constitutional
Court of June 16, 1998.
Suárez Rosero Case,
op. cit. paragraph 91.
Idem, paragraph 90.
paragraphs 70 and 71.
Report 12/96,. Suárez Rosero
Case, op. cit.,
paragraph 25; Genie Lacayo Case,
Judgment of January 29, 1997, paragraph 77. See also European Court of
Human Rights, Series A 195; Ruiz
Mateos vs. Spain, Series A 262 (1993).
Article 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ecuador provides that
a provisional dismissal of the proceedings suspends substantiation for
a period of five years, a period during which new evidence may be
presented in connection with the offense or with the responsibility or
innocence of the accused.
Suárez Rosero Case, op. cit. paragraph 77.
Judgment rendered by the Second Division of the Superior Court of
Quito, July 5, 1999, paragraph 7.