REPORT Nº 52/01

CASE 12.243

JUAN RAUL GARZA

UNITED STATES (*)

April 4, 2001  

            I.          SUMMARY 

1.          The petition in the present case was lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission”) against the United States of America (the "State," the "United States," or the “U.S.”) on December 20, 1999 by six individuals: Hugh Southey, a Barrister with Tooks Chambers in London, United Kingdom; Michael Mansfield, QC, representing the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales; John Quigley, Professor of International Law at Ohio State University; William Shabas, then Professor of International Human Rights Law at the University of Quebec at Montreal; Gregory Weirciock, an attorney in Houston, Texas; and Mark Norman, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales (hereinafter the “Petitioner’s representatives”). 

2.            The petition was filed on behalf of Juan Raul Garza (the “Petitioner”), an inmate on Federal death row in the United States.  In their petition and subsequent observations, the Petitioner’s representatives have alleged that Mr. Garza’s death sentence violates his right to life under Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the "American Declaration" or the "Declaration"), and that the procedures employed by the State in sentencing Mr. Garza to death violate his right to equal protection of the law under Article II of the Declaration, his right to a fair trial under Article XVIII of the Declaration and his right to due process under Article XXVI of the Declaration.  In particular, the petition contests the introduction during the sentencing phase of the Petitioner’s criminal proceeding of evidence of four unadjudicated murders that Mr. Garza was alleged to have perpetrated in Mexico, which evidence was considered by the jury in determining whether Mr. Garza should be sentenced to death.  The petition also indicated that, according to information provided by the United States at that time, Mr. Garza’s execution date might be set for February 2000.  Mr. Garza's execution was subsequently scheduled to take place on August 5, 2000, following which then-U.S. President William J. Clinton granted Mr. Garza two temporary reprieves, one on August 2, 2000, and the second on December 7, 2000.  The Petitioner's representatives have claimed that, should Mr. Garza be executed, it will constitute the first execution under U.S. federal law in excess of 35 years. 

3.            In the present Report, having examined the information and arguments provided by the parties, the Commission decided to admit the case in relation to Articles I, XVIII, and XXVI of the Declaration, with the exception of further claims under Articles I and II of the Declaration raised by the Petitioner in observations dated September 22, 2000, which the Commission declared to be inadmissible.  In addition, after considering the merits of the case, the Commission found the State responsible for violations of Articles I, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration, in connection with the procedure followed by the State in sentencing the Petitioner to death.  Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the State provide Mr. Garza with an effective remedy, which includes commutation of his death sentence.  The Commission also decided to recommend that the State review its laws, procedures and practices to ensure that persons who are accused of capital crimes are tried and sentenced in accordance with the rights under the American Declaration, including in particular prohibiting the introduction of evidence of unadjudicated crimes during the sentencing phase of capital trials.

II.            PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION  

4.            On January 27, 2000, the Commission decided to open Case Nº 12.243 in relation to Mr. Garza’s complaint, and by note of the same date transmitted the pertinent parts of the Petitioner’s petition to the State, with a request that the State deliver information that it considered pertinent to the complaint within 90 days as prescribed by the Commission’s Regulations.  In addition, in light of the information in the petition indicating that Mr. Garza’s execution may be scheduled for February 2000, the Commission decided to adopt precautionary measures pursuant to Article 29(2) of its Regulations and requested in its January 27, 2000 communication to the State that the United States take all necessary measures to preserve Mr. Garza’s life and physical integrity so as not to hinder the processing of his case before the inter-American system. The Commission based its request on the fact that, if the State were to execute Mr. Garza before the Commission had an opportunity to examine his case, any eventual decision would be rendered moot in respect of the efficacy of potential remedies, and irreparable harm would be caused to Mr. Garza.  Also by note dated January 27, 2000, the Commission informed the Petitioner’s representatives that Mr. Garza's petition had been transmitted to the State and that the Commission had adopted precautionary measures in relation to Mr. Garza. 

5.            In a communication dated February 7, 2000, the Petitioner’s representatives provided the Commission with additional information relevant to their complaint, including a copy of the transcript from Mr. Garza’s sentencing hearing, and copies of the decisions of the domestic courts that had considered Mr. Garza’s appeals from his conviction and sentence.  In their communication, the Petitioner's representatives did not indicate that a date for Mr. Garza's execution had yet been scheduled.  

6.            By note dated May 8, 2000, the Commission reiterated its request for the State to provide information relating to Mr. Garza’s petition, which the Commission asked the State to provide within 30 days.  

7.            In a note dated May 11, 2000, the State requested that the Commission grant it an extension of time of 45 days within which to file a response to the Petitioner’s petition.  By communication dated May 18, 2000, the Commission granted the State’s request for an extension of time, on the understanding that the State would take all necessary measures to preserve Mr. Garza’s life and physical integrity in accordance with the Commission’s previous request for precautionary measures.

8.            In a letter dated May 29, 2000, the Petitioner’s representatives provided the Commission with a copy of a decision issued by the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, on May 26, 2000, ordering that Mr. Garza be executed on August 5, 2000 at 6:00 a.m. 

9.            By note dated May 31, 2000, the Commission transmitted the pertinent parts of the Petitioner’s May 29, 2000 communication to the State, with a response requested within 30 days.  The Commission also reiterated its previous call for an urgent response to its January 27, 2000 request for precautionary measures, in light of the scheduling of Mr. Garza’s execution date.  By communication of the same date, the Commission informed the Petitioner’s representatives that these steps had been taken. 

10.            On or about July 14, 2000, the Commission received information that then-U.S. President William J. Clinton would postpone Mr. Garza’s scheduled August 5, 2000 execution date until the U.S. Department of Justice had completed drafting guidelines for seeking presidential clemency in such cases.  Accordingly, by communication dated July 17, 2000, the Commission requested that the State provide the Commission on an urgent basis with information respecting the current status of Mr. Garza’s death sentence.  By note of the same date, the Commission likewise requested that the Petitioner’s representatives provide the Commission with an urgent communication informing the Commission of the current status of Mr. Garza’s death sentence.  

11.            By note dated July 20, 2000, the State transmitted to the Commission its observations on the Petitioner’s petition.  In its observations, the State expressed the view that the Commission's request for precautionary measures in Mr. Garza's case was not binding but rather only constituted a non-binding "recommendation," of which the State had taken note.  The Commission subsequently transmitted the pertinent parts of the State’s observations to the Petitioner’s representatives, with a response requested within 30 days.  

12.            In a letter dated August 7, 2000, the Petitioner’s representatives provided the Commission with a copy of an “Executive Grant of Clemency” dated August 2, 2000 and signed by U.S. President Clinton, which granted a reprieve of Mr. Garza’s execution date from August 5, 2000 to December 12, 2000 and established December 12, 2000 as the new date for Mr. Garza’s execution. 

13.            By communication dated August 19, 2000, the Petitioner’s representatives delivered to the Commission a response to the State’s observations of July 20, 2000, and requested a hearing in the Petitioner’s case during the Commission’s next period of sessions.  The Commission subsequently transmitted the pertinent parts of the Petitioner’s observations to the State in a note dated August 23, 2000, with a response requested within 30 days. 

14.            In notes dated September 12, 2000, the Commission informed the Petitioner’s representatives and the State that a hearing in the Petitioner’s case had been scheduled for October 12, 2000 during the Commission’s 108^th period of sessions at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of receiving the parties’ representations on the admissibility and merits of the case. 

15.            By communication dated September 22, 2000, the Petitioner’s representatives delivered to the Commission a document entitled “Request to Raise Additional Matters,” and by note of the same date the Commission transmitted a copy of the document to the State, with a request for observations within 30 days.  

16.            In a note dated September 25, 2000, the State provided the Commission with a “Second Reply” to the Petitioner’s petition.  By communication dated September 26, 2000, the Commission transmitted the pertinent parts of the State’s second reply to the Petitioner’s representatives, with a response requested within 30 days.  

17.            On October 12, 2000, the Commission convened a hearing in the Petitioner’s case during its 108^th period of sessions in Washington D.C. Representatives of both the Petitioner and the State attended the hearing, presented oral representations to the Commission respecting the admissibility and merits of the Petitioner’s case, and delivered written summaries of their oral submissions.

18.            Subsequently, by communication dated November 16, 2000, the State delivered to the Commission a document entitled "Response of the Government of the United States to October 12, 2000 Submission by Petitioner."  The Commission transmitted the pertinent parts of the State's response to the Petitioner's representatives in a note dated November 17, 2000.

19.            By communication dated November 21, 2000, the Petitioner's representatives indicated that in light of Mr. Garza's scheduled execution on December 12, 2000, they did not intend to comment on the State's additional observations, but rather requested that the Commission consider the merits of the petition so that a report with recommendations could be issued before December 12, 2000.

III.             POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 

A.            Position of the Petitioner 

1.                Admissibility 

20.            In their initial petition and subsequent observations, the Petitioner’s representatives have contended that Mr. Garza’s petition is admissible in accordance with the requirements of the Commission’s Regulations.  They first argue that Mr. Garza has exhausted domestic remedies in accordance with Article 37 of the Commission’s Regulations, as he pursued appeals and constitutional remedies in both the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with the U.S. Supreme Court dismissing his final petition for a Writ of Certiorari on November 15, 1999.

21.            In addition, the Petitioner’s representatives argue that Mr. Garza has complied with Article 38 of the Commission’s Regulations, as his petition was lodged with the Commission on December 20, 1999 and therefore within 6 months of the date of the final domestic judgment in his case. 

22.            Moreover, the Petitioner's observations indicate that no proceedings are pending or have been decided by the Commission or any other international organization raising the subject matter of Mr. Garza’s petition, in compliance with Article 39 of the Commission’s Regulations.  

23.            With respect to the claims raised in their September 22, 2000 "Request to Raise Additional Matters", which, as discussed below, allege violations of Mr. Garza's rights under Articles I and II of the Declaration based upon a document issued by the U.S. Department of Justice on September 12, 2000 and entitled "Report on the Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-2000)," the Petitioner's representatives argue that, as Mr. Garza's execution is scheduled for December 12, 2000, any attempts to raise the issues contained in the September 22, 2000 request in a domestic forum is unlikely to produce results until shortly before that scheduled execution date.  Consequently, the Petitioners argue that there would be no opportunity to make the allegations of human rights abuses contained in the request in sufficient time to enable the Commission to consider them before execution, and therefore that it is appropriate for the Commission to consider the matters raised in their September 22, 2000 request. 

2.                Merits 

24.            With respect to the merits of the case, the Petitioner’s representatives indicate that Mr. Garza is a U.S. national who was tried and convicted by a jury in the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, under U.S. Federal law on three counts of killing in the furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, among other offenses, and sentenced by the same jury to death.  They also confirm that in his proceedings before the Commission, Mr. Garza does not challenge these convictions, but rather takes issue with the punishment that he has received for these crimes.  In particular, the Petitioner’s representatives argue that the State is responsible for violations of Mr. Garza’s rights under Articles I, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration, as a consequence of the fact that the death penalty has been imposed upon Mr. Garza, as well as certain aspects of the process through which Mr. Garza was afforded this punishment. 

25.            With respect to Article I of the Declaration, the Petitioner’s representatives have raised four principal arguments.  First, they contend that international law has developed such that capital punishment per se violates the right to life and therefore that Mr. Garza’s death sentence in and of itself contravenes Article I of the Declaration.  In this connection, the Petitioner’s representatives argue that the Declaration should be regarded as a living instrument that reflects the standards of democratic and just societies as they develop.[1]  While the Petitioner's representatives recognize that the Commission has held in past reports that the death penalty is not per se contrary to the right to life, they urge that the standards inherent in the Declaration have now developed to the extent that capital punishment should be regarded as contrary to Article I of the Declaration, and that the intentions of the original drafters of the Declaration cannot be determinative in this respect. 

26.            In support of this contention, the Petitioner’s representatives present several arguments.  They first claim that there is a clear worldwide trend that individual nation states are abolishing the death penalty,[2] and, consistent with this trend, that the United Nations human rights system supports the abolition of the death penalty and has encouraged states to reduce their use of the death penalty.[3]  They also note the fact that the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda do not include capital punishment among the penalties that may be imposed by those tribunals.  In relation to the Americas in particular, the Petitioner's representatives refer to the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty as evidence of a “commitment” by the Organization of American States to the abolition of the death penalty. 

27.            Alternatively, the Petitioner’s representatives argue that Mr. Garza’s death sentence contravenes Article I of the American Declaration because international law requires states to progressively restrict the application of the death penalty.  Contrary to this trend, however, the United States has effectively re-introduced the death penalty after a 35-year absence of Federal executions between 1972 and 1988 and, on two occasions since November 18, 1988, has expanded it to apply to new offenses.[4]  In addition to the arguments cited above respecting the unlawfulness of the death penalty per se, the Petitioner's representatives contend that by protecting the right to life, the American Declaration implicitly suggests that the abolition of the death penalty is desirable and that one of the objects and purposes of the Declaration is the restriction of the use of the death penalty.[5]  They also argue that the worldwide trend toward a reduction in the use of the death penalty suggests that there is no sufficient justification for an increase in the use of the death penalty and therefore that any such increase instituted by a state is arbitrary. According to the Petitioner's representatives, it is difficult to see what justification there can be for re-introducing the death penalty when so many states have found that they are able to abolish it. 

28.            In the further alternative, the Petitioner’s representatives contend that the decision by the State to seek the death penalty in the circumstances of Mr. Garza’s case was arbitrary contrary to Article I of the American Declaration, for two reasons: it was based upon political concerns and therefore lacked sufficient and proper justification; and, as argued in the Petitioner's September 22, 2000 "Request to Raise Additional Matters," the State's own statistics indicate that decisions by U.S. attorneys since 1988 as to whether to seek the federal death penalty appear to have been influenced by racial and geographic disparities.  In this respect, the Petitioner's representatives suggest that the Petitioner need only establish a prima facie case that the application of capital punishment in his case is arbitrary, upon which it is for the State to show that there is no violation of Article I of the Declaration.[6]  

29.            With regard to the first point, the Petitioner’s representatives submit that the State can show no rational reason for seeking and imposing the death penalty in Mr. Garza’s case such as deterrence,[7] but rather that any proposed reasons are political in nature and therefore cannot be regarded as legitimate justifications for the use of capital punishment.[8]  In the view of the Petitioner’s representatives, to the extent that it is not per se contrary to the Declaration, the death penalty's use must be limited to circumstances in which it is intended to protect the rights of others under the Declaration.  They refer in this respect to previous determinations by the Commission that the death penalty can only be imposed for crimes of “exceptional gravity.”[9]  

30.            With regard to the second point noted above, the Petitioner's representatives rely upon a statistical study released by the U.S. Department of Justice on September 12, 2000 entitled "The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-2000)" which, according to the Petitioner’s representatives, reveals discrepancies in the application of the federal death penalty throughout the United States that may be considered to render Mr. Garza's execution prima facie arbitrary.  In this respect, the Petitioner’s representatives explain that at the time when federal prosecutors sought the death penalty in Mr. Garza's case, U.S. attorneys were only required to submit to the U.S. Attorney General for approval cases in which they wished to seek the death penalty.  They were not required to submit cases in which the death penalty was not being sought, cases in which a plea was accepted in return for a sentence other than death, cases where a decision was taken that a case would not be prosecuted at the federal level, or cases in which the matter was charged in such a way that it did not attract the death penalty.  As a consequence, the Petitioner's representatives claim that there was no procedure for ensuring that the approach of local US attorneys to the selection of cases for submission to the Attorney General was consistent.  They further claim that a Protocol introduced by the Justice Department in January 1995 eliminated one element of discretion, by requiring U.S. attorneys to submit to the Attorney General for review all cases in which a defendant is charged with a capital-eligible offense, regardless of whether the U.S. attorney actually desires to seek the death penalty in that case. 

31.            In this context, the Petitioner's representatives claim that the State's survey reveals evidence of two types of discrepancies in the application of the U.S. federal death penalty.  First, they claim that the survey reveals geographic disparities across the United States in decisions by U.S. prosecutors to seek the death penalty.[10]  In addition, they claim that, according to the statistics, the federal death penalty has been sought on a disproportionately more frequent basis for non-white offenders than for white offenders.[11] The Petitioner's representatives therefore argue that this statistical information constitutes prima facie evidence that local U.S. attorneys were not taking the decision to seek the death penalty in a consistent manner at the time when the decision to seek the penalty was made in Mr. Garza’s case.  The Petitioner's representatives emphasize in this regard that it is crucial that prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty is taken in a consistent manner to ensure that it is not applied arbitrarily.[12]  

32.            The Petitioner’s representatives state further that the arbitrary nature of the decision to seek the death penalty in Mr. Garza's case is reinforced by material obtained by Mr. Garza’s attorneys, which, according to their observations, indicates that in many cases of multiple homicides arising out of drug-related or other criminal enterprises, federal authorities have not sought the death penalty.[13] While recognizing that it is “obviously difficult” for Mr. Garza’s attorneys to produce any form of comprehensive statistics showing a lack of consistency in the decision to seek the death penalty, the Petitioner’s representatives claim that the material that they have provided is sufficient to make a prima facie case that the decision to seek the death penalty in Mr. Garza’s case was arbitrary.

33.            As their second principal argument, the Petitioner’s representatives contend that the process employed by the State in sentencing Mr. Garza to death violated his rights to a fair trial and to due process under Articles XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration.  In particular, the petition alleges that during the sentencing phase of Mr. Garza’s criminal proceeding, the prosecution introduced as aggravating factors evidence of five unadjudicated murders that Mr. Garza was alleged to have committed, four of which were alleged to have occurred in Mexico.  According to the Petitioner’s representatives, Mexican authorities were unable to solve any of these four homicides, and Mr. Garza had never been charged or convicted of any of these murders.  However, the U.S. Government sent Customs agents to Mexico to investigate these closed cases, and then introduced resulting evidence during Mr. Garza’s sentencing hearing.

34.            Mr. Garza contends that this practice violated the due process and fair trial protections under the American Declaration, because the jury, having convicted Mr. Garza of capital murder, could not be regarded as an impartial tribunal in assessing evidence of further murders for the purposes of sentencing.  Alternatively, Mr. Garza argues that if evidence of this nature was not by its nature inadmissible, his right to equality of arms was violated because he was unable to conduct his own meaningful investigation of unadjudicated murders in Mexico, and therefore could not obtain favorable documentary evidence and the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf. 

35.            The first argument proffered by the Petitioner’s representatives contends that Mr. Garza was, in effect, convicted and sentenced to death for eight murders, only three of which were proved through a proper criminal trial, and five of which were adjudicated during a sentencing hearing where the rules of procedure did not offer the guarantees of impartiality and sound evidence necessary in trying and convicting individuals for capital crimes.  In support of their argument, the Petitioner's representatives observe that at the time of filing their petition, eight states in the United States imposed a complete ban on the presentation of evidence of unadjudicated offenses during the sentencing phase of capital trials, and have therefore recognized the unfairness of having to answer criminal allegations in front of a jury that has already found a person guilty of serous misconduct.[14]  

36.            The Petitioner’s representatives emphasize that a person facing the death penalty is entitled to all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, and argue that in considering whether Mr. Garza had received a fair trial for the four unadjudicated murders alleged to have occurred, it must be determined whether there was a “reasonable appearance” of a lack of impartiality on the part of the jury or whether the impartiality of the jury "was capable of appearing to the [defendant] to be open to doubt."[15]  Further, they contend that requiring a jury to determine whether a person is guilty of serious criminal conduct when that same jury has already determined that the person is guilty of other offenses gives rise to a particular risk of unfairness and thereby infringes that person’s right to a fair trial.  The Petitioner’s observations refer in this regard to the dissenting decisions of several U.S. Supreme Court justices, who have expressed the view that the use of evidence of unadjudicated offenses in capital sentencing hearings is improper under the U.S. Constitution.[16]  

37.            In the context of Mr. Garza’s case, the Petitioner’s representatives state that when evidence was presented during the sentencing phase of Mr. Garza’s trial to prove his involvement in offenses for which he had never been previously tried, the jury was required to consider whether he was guilty of those additional offenses "beyond a reasonable doubt."  Accordingly, the Petitioner's representatives argue that these were offenses for which Mr. Garza would effectively receive punishment and therefore to which the presumption of innocence applied, and consequently that the existence of a reasonable appearance of a lack of impartiality on the part of the jury undermined the fairness of Mr. Garza’s criminal proceedings.  According to the Petitioner’s representatives, this lack of impartiality was particularly acute as a result of the complexity of the task that the jury was asked to conduct during the sentencing stage, as reflected in the 36-question "Special Findings Form" that the jury was required to complete.  

38.            The Petitioner’s representatives further submit that the risk of unfairness from introducing the evidence of unadjudicated offenses at Mr. Garza’s sentencing hearing was amplified by the fact that the rules of evidence that would normally apply to the determination of a criminal charge were not applied when the jury was presented with the evidence of the unadjudicated murders.  According to the Petitioner’s representatives, these rules are normally an important protection for defendants in the guilt-innocence stage of a criminal proceeding where the defendant need not prove anything and the burden lies entirely upon the prosecution.  As a consequence, they claim that the State denied Mr. Garza the highest standard of procedural fairness applicable in cases involving the death penalty. 

39.            In addition, the Petitioner’s representatives claim that the practice of introducing evidence of unadjudicated foreign murders at Mr. Garza’s sentencing proceeding violated the principle in Article XXVI of the Declaration that defendants be “tried…in accordance with pre-existing laws.”  In particular, they argue that the murders alleged to have committed in Mexico did not occur within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States as required under 18 U.S.C., Section 1111(b), and therefore could not have been tried as Federal crimes under existing U.S. law at the time when they were alleged to have been perpetrated. 

40.            Alternatively, in the event that the introduction of evidence of unadjudicated offenses during sentencing proceedings for capital crimes is not considered per se contrary to the due process and fair trial protections under the American Declaration, the Petitioner’s representatives argue that this practice nevertheless violated Mr. Garza’s right to due process, and in particular his right to equality of arms.  Specifically, it is argued on behalf of Mr. Garza that mechanisms were available to the State under the Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for Mutual Legal Assistance (hereinafter the "US-Mexico MLAT"),[17] that permitted the State to investigate the Mexican murders, but that these mechanisms are not available to defendants such as Mr. Garza.  Consequently, it is contended that Mr. Garza could not obtain exculpatory evidence under the same conditions that incriminating evidence against him was obtained by the prosecution, in violation of the right to equality of arms. 

41.            In this respect, the Petitioner’s representatives observe that the relative ability of the prosecution and defense to gather evidence is relevant to the principle of equality of arms, and requires that steps be taken so that the advantages that the prosecution inevitably enjoys do not disadvantage the defense.[18]  Further, the Petitioner’s representatives argue that the principle of equality of arms is a part of the right to a fair trial contained in the American Declaration, and that the due process requirements of the Declaration apply to the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.[19] In the context of Mr. Garza’s sentencing, it is claimed that the principle of equality of arms was not respected because, as a result of its greater resources and the US-Mexico MLAT, the prosecution was in a better position to obtain evidence from Mexico.  In particular, the Petitioner’s representatives state that Mr. Garza was subject to a clear inequality, because the U.S. prosecution authorities were entitled under the treaty to seek assistance from the Mexican authorities, whereas Mr. Garza was not entitled to any such assistance. 

42.            As an example of such inequality, the Petitioner’s representatives refer to the fact that one of the ways in which the equality of arms is normally secured in domestic prosecutions is through the requirement that the U.S. authorities disclose all relevant material to the defense.  In contrast, the Mexican authorities were under no such obligation to disclose relevant material to Mr. Garza.  Further, according to his representatives, Mr. Garza, unlike the State, had no power to subpoena witnesses in Mexico.  

43.            The Petitioner’s representatives also indicate in this connection that, to-date, there does not exist a letters rogatory process between the United States and Mexico on criminal matters, in that neither state has extended the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory to apply in criminal matters.  Further, while the Petitioner’s representatives have recognized the existence of letters rogatory processes between states as a matter of custom, they have asserted that the degree of cooperation between states with respect to litigation varies widely, which explains in part why states execute separate mutual legal assistance treaties such as the US-Mexico MLAT.  Moreover, they point out that during his pre-trial hearing, Mr. Garza was denied a request to have the prosecution seek specific exculpatory evidence from the Mexican authorities on his behalf.

B.             Position of the State 

44.            With respect to the admissibility of Mr. Garza’s petition generally, the State contends that the petition should be considered inadmissible because it is manifestly ill-founded and fails to state facts that constitute a violation of any of the rights under the American Declaration.  In addition, specifically in respect of the claims raised in the Petitioner's September 22, 2000 "Request to Raise Additional Matters," the State argues that the Commission should reject and declare inadmissible these new claims, because the Petitioner failed to raise them before any U.S. courts. 

45.            In support of its position that the petition as a whole should be considered inadmissible under Article 41 of the Commission's Regulations, the State has provided observations respecting the merits of Mr. Garza’s complaints, with a view to demonstrating their groundless nature.  

46.            More particularly, with respect to the background to the case, the State indicates that for over a decade, Mr. Garza controlled and operated a major drug trafficking enterprise, through which he sold thousands of pounds of marijuana in the United States smuggled from Mexico.  As his criminal enterprise grew in scope, Mr. Garza decided to eliminate individuals from his organization who had earned his suspicion, and to this end either ordered or carried out the execution-style murders in the United States of three individuals. 

47.            After a trial in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Mr. Garza was convicted of five violations of federal drug trafficking laws, operating a continuing criminal enterprise, money laundering, and three counts of killing in the furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise.  During the punishment phase of Mr. Garza’s proceeding, the government introduced evidence showing that he had committed four additional murders in Mexico, three by gunshot and one by strangulation and suffocation.  Following the punishment hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death. 

48.            Mr. Garza’s convictions and sentence were subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, following which the Fifth Circuit denied a request for a re-hearing en banc, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Further, in December 1997, Mr. Garza filed a motion to vacate his sentence under the U.S. federal habeas corpus statute, arguing that the government’s introduction of evidence relating to the four murders in Mexico violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  This motion was denied in April 1998. Mr. Garza subsequently requested a certificate of appealability from the U.S. District Court, as required under 28 U.S.C., Section 2253(1), in order to appeal the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus, and the request was denied.  Mr. Garza appealed this determination to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and it also denied his request, for the reason that he had not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.  Finally, on November 15, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Mr. Garza certiorari review of this decision. 

49.            In support of its contention that Mr. Garza’s rights under the American Declaration have not been violated, the State first argues that Article I of the Declaration did not at the time of its adoption nor does it presently prohibit the death penalty.  The United States emphasizes in this regard that a state cannot be bound to legal obligations, either under treaties or under customary international law, that it has not explicitly accepted, and contends that the Petitioner’s representatives cannot claim that general language in an instrument negotiated in 1948 has taken on a different meaning 50 years later so as to prohibit the United States from employing the death penalty.  Rather, the State argues that governments must consent to any such modifications through, for example, the adoption of additional protocols to treaties. 

50.            The State also argues that the Petitioner has failed to establish that international law precludes the use of the death penalty.  Rather, the State contends that the death penalty is permitted under international law when applied to serious crimes and pursuant to proceedings that comply with due process.  According to the State, the undisputed fact is that a majority of nations retain the option of imposing the death penalty for the most serious offenses, and in this respect Mr. Garza’s case is no exception.  The State notes further that the UN Secretary General reported to the UN Commission on Human Rights that as of March 10, 1999, 87 countries retained and used the death penalty for the most serious ordinary crimes and that another 26 countries retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but had not executed any one in the previous 10 years. Moreover, the State indicates that only 65 countries have formally abolished the death penalty for all crimes.  Based upon these statistics, the State contends that state practice is clear and consistent, and that there is no prohibition under international law on the use of the death penalty.  In the context of the Petitioner’s case, it is the State’s position that Mr. Garza’s crimes were sufficiently serious to merit a sentence of death. 

            51.            With respect to the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the U.S. Justice Department's September 12, 2000 report on the Federal death penalty, should the Commission decide to consider his claims in this regard, the State argues that mere statistical studies are insufficient to establish a claim that the death penalty is imposed in a racially discriminatory manner so as to violate the right to life.[20]  In summary, the State submits that the Petitioner’s representatives have failed to identify any evidence that race played a factor in Mr. Garza’s case.  To the contrary, the State notes that the Petitioner's representatives have admitted that “[c]learly, Mr. Garza had been found guilty of offenses that made him eligible for the death penalty under the federal statute.”  

52.            The State also argues that the Petitioner has not established a violation of either the right to a fair trial or the right to due process of law in relation to Mr. Garza’s criminal proceeding.  In particular, according to the State, the Petitioner’s contention that introducing evidence of unadjudicated murders during Mr. Garza’s sentencing hearing per se violated his right to due process and a fair trial by reason of the consequential lack of impartiality on the part of the jury lacks merit.  Rather, the State argues that the jury is best positioned to understand the nature and severity of the crimes committed by the defendant, namely the three murders for which Mr. Garza was convicted, and that the previous trial for these crimes did not render the jury prejudicial, only better informed. 

53.            Similarly, with respect to the Petitioner’s alternative argument that Mr. Garza was denied equality of arms due to the manner in which the evidence of unadjudicated murders was gathered and presented at the sentencing hearing, the State contends there was nothing about Mr. Garza’s trial, at the guilt/innocence or sentencing phase, that fell short of international standards for equality of arms and Mr. Garza’s right to a fair trial.  The State further argues in this respect that the principle of equality of arms protects procedural rather than substantive equality, and therefore that the fact that the State may have more resources than a defendant–which, the State notes, it almost invariably does–cannot found a claim that a particular proceeding was not fair. 

54.            Rather, in the circumstances of Mr. Garza’s prosecution, the State alleges that neither the law nor the court imposed any condition that placed Mr. Garza at a substantial disadvantage vis a vis the prosecution, in that Mr. Garza was free to impeach the prosecution’s evidence in any manner and to call witnesses in his defense.  In this respect, the State argues that the procedural conditions at sentencing were the same for both parties, and the fact that certain evidence was accumulated in Mexico is of no legal import.  According to the State, nothing prevented Mr. Garza from collecting mitigating evidence on his behalf, whether in Mexico or in the United States, and proffering that evidence at his sentencing hearing. 

55.            The State provides several arguments in support of its contention that mere access to greater resources by the State, in the present case through the MLAT between the United States and Mexico, cannot form the basis of a claim of inequality of arms.  In particular, the State submits that this treaty merely enhances the State’s ability to collect evidence against the accused and in no way restrains the defense from challenging that evidence or presenting his own evidence.  The State also points in this respect to the fact that the U.S. Constitution requires the prosecution to turn over to the accused before trial all aggravating or mitigating evidence.  Further, the State argues that neither the existence of the MLAT between the U.S. and Mexico nor the decision by the U.S. and Mexico not to apply the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory to criminal matters affect the ability of a litigant, civil or criminal, from obtaining evidence through letters rogatory, as this process is rooted in custom between countries regardless of their treaty relations.   

56.            In support of its argument that equality of arms secures only procedural and not substantive equality, the State relies in particular upon the July 15, 1999 judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”) in the case The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic.[21] In this case, the defense alleged that the lack of cooperation and the obstruction by certain external entities–the Government of the Republika Srpska and the civic authorities in Prijedor–prevented it from properly presenting its case at trial and accordingly that there was no “equality of arms” between the prosecution and defense at trial so as to frustrate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  In responding to Tadic's argument, the Prosecution contended, inter alia, that the principle of equality of arms entitles both parties the same access to the powers of the court and the same right to present their cases, but does not call for equalizing the material and practical circumstances of the two parties.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected the defense position, on the basis that the defendant failed to show that the protection offered by the principles of equality of arms was not extended to him by the ICTY Trial Chamber.  In reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber held that “equality of arms obliges a judicial body to ensure that neither party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its case.” The State regards Mr. Garza’s claim as being markedly similar to that in the Tadic case, and contends that the Commission should similarly reject Mr. Garza’s argument on this point.  

57.            Further, according to the State, the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee have likewise interpreted equality of arms as protecting procedural rather than substantive equality, and cites in support cases including Dombo Beheer B.V. v. Netherlands[22] and B.d.B. et al. v. The Netherlands.[23]  Applying these authorities in the context of the Petitioner’s case, the State claims that neither the law nor the court imposed any conditions that placed Mr. Garza at a substantial disadvantage in relation to the prosecution, but rather that the procedural conditions at trial and at sentencing were the same for both parties.

58.            With respect to the rules of evidence applicable during Mr. Garza’s sentencing hearing, the State agrees that the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply during a Federal capital sentencing proceeding in the United States, but argues that this works to the benefit and detriment of both parties and is therefore consistent with the nature of the equality of arms principle.  Of particular significance in this regard, the State contends that the Petitioner’s representatives misunderstand the purpose of a sentencing hearing which, according to the State, is not to prove guilt, but rather is meant to determine the appropriate punishment for the defendant’s crimes, taking account of all relevant evidence. 

59.            Moreover, the State contends that the rules applicable to a sentencing hearing that permit liberal submission of evidence by both parties were developed principally to protect the defendant in capital cases, not the prosecution.[24] Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present case, the State is of the view that Mr. Garza was simply unable to marshal sufficient mitigating evidence to avoid the death sentence, and therefore that this case does not warrant a finding that federal law did not protect his rights to due process or a fair trial.

IV.               ANALYSIS

A.             Commission's Competence 

60.            The Petitioner claims that the State has violated his rights under Articles I, XVIII, and XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.  The State is a member of the Organization of American States that is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights, as provided for in Article 20 of the Commission's Statute and Article 51 of the Commission's Regulations, and deposited its instrument of ratification of the OAS Charter on June 19, 1951.[25] The events raised in the Petitioner's claim occurred subsequent to the State's ratification of the OAS Charter.  The Petitioner is a natural person, and the Petitioner’s representatives are authorized under Article 26 of the Commission's Regulations to lodge the petition on his behalf.  The Commission is therefore competent to examine this petition. 

B.                Admissibility 

61.            With respect to the admissibility of the Petitioner's petition, the information presented by the parties indicates that Mr. Garza unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, the latter having dismissed his petition for a Writ of Certiorari and his petition for rehearing in 1996.[26] It also indicates that Mr. Garza pursued constitutional remedies before the U.S. District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, for alleged violations of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and was likewise unsuccessful, the U.S. Supreme Court having dismissed his final petition for a Writ of Certiorari on November 15, 1999.  The State has not alleged or otherwise established that Mr. Garza has failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him in the United States.  Accordingly, the Commission finds that the claims of violations of Articles I, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration contained in the Petitioner's petition of December 20, 1999 are not inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with Article 37 of the Commission's Regulations. 

62.            In addition, the record in this case indicates that Mr. Garza's petition was lodged with the Commission on December 20, 1999, and therefore within 6 months of the dismissal by the U.S. Supreme Court of his final petition for a Writ of Certiorari on November 15, 1999.  The State has not contested the timeliness of Mr. Garza's petition. The Commission therefore does not find the Petitioner's petition to be inadmissible for violation of the 6-month period under Article 38 of the Commission's Regulations.  

63.            Further, according to the Petitioner's representatives, the issue of Mr. Garza's execution has not been previously considered by the Commission, nor is it pending in another international proceeding for settlement.  The State has not alleged that Mr. Garza's petition is duplicitous.  Accordingly, the Commission finds that the Petitioner's petition is not inadmissible under Article 39 of the Commission's Regulations. 

64.            Finally, with respect to the requirements of Article 41 of the Commission's Regulations, the State has contended that Mr. Garza's petition should be considered inadmissible because it is manifestly ill-founded and fails to state facts that constitute a violation of any of the rights under the American Declaration.  Having reviewed the Parties' observations and other material on the record in this matter, and in light of the heightened level of scrutiny that the Commission has traditionally applied in cases involving the implementation of capital punishment, the Commission considers that the Petitioner's petition is not manifestly groundless and contains facts that, if proven, may establish violations of Articles I, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration.  Consequently, the Commission does not find Mr. Garza's petition to be inadmissible under Article 41 of the Commission's Regulations. 

65.            With regard to the Petitioner's September 22, 2000 "Request to Raise Additional Matters," in which the Petitioner's representatives allege violations of Mr. Garza's rights under Articles I and II of the Declaration in connection with the U.S. Justice Department's September 12, 2000 "Report on the Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-2000)," the State argues that these constitute new claims based upon new alleged facts and arguments that were not a part of the Petitioner's original petition, and which have not been raised before any U.S. court.  The Petitioner's representatives have not alleged that Mr. Garza has exhausted domestic remedies in respect of these claims or that such remedies are not available or effective.  Rather, they argue that any attempt to secure domestic relief would likely not produce results until shortly before Mr. Garza's scheduled execution date, and as a consequence would deprive the Commission of an opportunity to address the merits of these claims at that stage and prior to Mr. Garza's execution.  Consequently, the Petitioner's representatives urge the Commission to consider these claims. 

66.            The Commission recognizes and is deeply concerned by the fact that its ability to effectively investigate and determine capital cases has frequently been undermined when states have scheduled and proceeded with the execution of condemned prisoners despite the fact that those prisoners have proceedings pending before the Commission.  It is for this reason that the Commission requests precautionary measures pursuant to Article 29(2) of its Regulations, as it has in Mr. Garza's case, to require a state to stay a condemned prisoner's execution until the Commission has had an opportunity to investigate his or her claims.  Anything less effectively deprives condemned prisoners of their right to petition in the inter-American human rights system and causes them serious and irreparable harm.  Accordingly, the Commission has on numerous occasions called upon the United States and other OAS member states to comply with the Commission's requests for precautionary measures in cases involving threats to the right to life and thereby properly and fully respect their international human rights obligations.[27]

67.            Notwithstanding these regrettable complications, however, the Commission is also obliged to apply the requirements prescribed by its Regulations and under general principles of international law governing the admissibility of claims presented to it, including the requirement that domestic remedies be invoked and exhausted.  In the present case, the claims raised in the Petitioner's September 22, 2000 request constitute additional claims based upon new facts and evidence that, according to the information available, have not been raised before domestic courts in the United States.  Moreover, the Petitioner has not alleged, and the Commission cannot conclude on the record before it, that domestic remedies are not available to address these claims, that the Petitioner has been prevented from exhausting them, or that such remedies would not be potentially effective.